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During the past decade, the study of interlanguage pragmatics has produced 
important empirical findings, primarily through the identification and 
comparison of speech act realization patterns in various languages based on 
data from both native and nonnative speakers. In addition to this focus on 
product, some attention has been paid to the processes of comprehension and 
production in second language pragmatics (Frerch & Kasper 1984, 1989; Kasper 
1984). In contrast to these concerns, there has been little discussion of how 
pragmatic abilities are acquired in a second language. 
This paper is concerned with the ways in which consciousness may be 
involved in learning the principles of discourse and pragmatics in a second 
language.1 The role of conscious and nonconscious processes in the 
acquisition of morphosyntax has been hotly debated within the field of second 
language acquisition (Krashen 1981, 1983; Munsell & Carr 1981; Rutherford & 
Sharwood Smith 1985; Seliger 1983; Sharwood Smith 1981), but these debates 
have ignored pragmatic and discoursal abilities. My discussion will of 
necessity be speculative, drawing on current theories of the role of 
consciousness in human learning in general, drawn primarily from cognitive 
science and experimental psychology, with some suggestions for the extension 
of general principles to the learning of pragmatics. This is an issue with 
important pedagogical implications. In second language teaching, as Richards 
(forthcoming) points out, there are currently two major approaches to the 
teaching of conversation in second language programs. The first is an indirect 
approach, in which conversational competence is seen as the product of 
engaging learners in conversational interaction; the underlying assumption is 
1 I am grateful to Michael Long, Paul Munsell, and Danny Steinberg for very helpful comM 
ments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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that the ability to carry on conversation (which includes pragmatic ability and 
other factors as well) is something that is acquired simply in the course of 
doing it. In practice, this leads to the use of group work activities or other tasks 
which require interaction. The second, a more direct approach, focuses 
explicitly on the strategies involved in conversation and emphasizes 
consciousness-raising concerning these strategies. 
1. Is pragmatic knowledge conscious or unconscious? 
Wolfson has argued that native speaker knowledge of what she calls rules of 
speaking (which include both pragmatic and discoursal rules) is mostly 
unconscious: 
Rules of speaking and, more generally, norms of interaction are .. .largely 
unconscious. What this means is that native speakers, although perfectly 
competent in the uses and interpretation of the patterns of speech behavior 
which prevail in their own communities are, with the exception of a few 
explicitly taught formulas, not even aware of the patterned nature of their 
speech behavior. [Native speakers] ... are not able ... to describe their own 
rules of speaking. (Wolfson 1989:37) 
Wolfson cites several types of evidence in support of her claim that 
speakers do not have reliable information concerning the ways in which they 
use language: people who are bilingual or bidialectal may switch from one 
language or variety to another without being aware of it and cannot accurately 
report their use of these languages or varieties {Blom & Gumperz 1972); native 
speakers often report that they typically use or do not use specific forms, but 
their descriptions do not match reality (Wolfson, D'Amico-Reisner & Huber 
1983); even highly trained linguists who rely on intuition to describe such 
phenomena as the differences between men's and women's speech (e.g. Lakoff 
1973) may find their intuitions proven incorrect; textbook writers, who almost 
always rely on intuition rather than empirical data, provide information 
regarding language use which is frequently wrong (Cathcart 1989; Holmes 
1988; Williams 1988). 
There are several reasons why we should expect native speakers' 
intuitions about these matters to be fallible. First, there is the obvious problem 
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of the intrusion of prescriptive norms, stereotypes, and folk-linguistic beliefs; 
when asked what they do, informants are likely to report what they think they 
should do. Second, this kind of introspection violates basic principles 
distinguishing between potentially accurate and inaccurate verbal reports 
(Ericsson & Simon 1984; Nisbett & Wilson 1977), because such intuitions are 
general rather than specific, retrospective rather than concurrent, and 
sometimes call for information which could not be reported even if the other 
conditions were met. Ericsson and Simon propose that the only information 
that is potentially available for accurate self-report is information which is 
attended to in short-term memory in the performance of a task. In other words, 
in order to give an accurate report of your own performance, you must have 
been paying attention and aware of what you were doing at the time. Speech 
act realizations and other aspects of rules of speaking are often produced by 
fluent speakers with little conscious reflection or deliberation during their 
performance, and are therefore not accurately reportable. If accurate self-
reports are limited to reporting information that has been stored as a result of 
one's own conscious thought processes, intuitions about the linguistic behavior 
of groups are particularly suspect (Cameron 1985). 
The evidence cited by Wolfson shows that native speakers do not 
necessarily have access to their own rules of speaking, but it fails to show that 
speakers never have any access to such rules. Blum-Kulka (1990) and Olshtain 
and Blum-Kulka (1989) have argued that Hebrew-English bilinguals in Israel 
exhibit heightened metapragmatic awareness and are aware of their code-
switching behavior. Odlin suggests that linguistic forms which are important 
for communicative competence are, in general, highly salient and accessible to 
awareness, which may be why the metalanguage observed in anthropological 
linguistics tends to describe linguistic functions more accurately than linguistic 
form (Odlin 1986). The fact that communicative behavior is sometimes 
accurately reportable is also compatible with the principle that accurate self-
report depends on information that is attended to during performance. 
Pragmatic and discoursal knowledge is not always used automatically and 
unreflectively. Conversations vary a great deal in terms of spontaneity and 
planning (Ochs 1979). Some people pre-plan telephone conversations, and 
writing involves a great deal of conscious deliberation and choices in discourse 
organization. There are many occasions on which particular care is given to 
producing appropriately polite language. Students may worry about which 
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address form to use to professors, and many aspects of the use of personal 
address are not unreflecting responses to a determining context but represent 
strategic and sometimes manipulative choices (Kendall1981). 
Pragmatic knowledge therefore seems to be partly conscious and partly 
accessible to consciousness, although it cannot be the case that all pragmatic 
knowledge is accessible to consciousness. Just as linguists seek to discover 
general principles of language which are reflected in the effortless control of 
grammar by native speakers but of which they have no conscious awareness, 
research in pragmatics seeks to identify patterns and general principles which 
native speakers are equally unable to articulate based on introspection. 
However, even if a great deal of pragmatic knowledge is held implicitly and 
cannot be articulated, this does not tell us how such knowledge was 
established. Skillful performance that currently relies on automatic processing 
and makes little demand on either attention or consciousness may have 
originated from conscious declarative knowledge (Lewis & Anderson 1985). 
General principles, patterns and rules of pragmatics may be beyond the reach 
of introspection, but this does not inform us of the possible role that awareness 
of crucial features of language rules, however incomplete and transitory, may 
play in the establishment of such knowledge (Munsell & Carr 1981). 
2. Consciousness and principles of language learning 
Our ordinary language use of words like conscious, consciousness and 
consciously is ambiguous. This is one reason why theorists in psychology and 
applied linguistics have preferred to use related technical terms such as 
explicit vs. implicit knowledge (Bialystok 1979, 1981; Krashen 1981; Odlin 
1986; Sharwood Smith 1981), controlled vs. automatic processing (Bialystok & 
Bouchard-Ryan 1985; Carro111981; McLaughlin, Rossman and McLoed 1983; 
Posner & Klein 1973; Shiffrin and Schneider 1977); declarative vs. procedural 
knowledge (Anderson 1982; Ellis 1989a; Frerch & Kasper 1984; O'Malley, 
Chamot & Walker 1987), serial vs. parallel processing (McClelland, Rumelhart, 
& the PDP Research Group 1986, and so on. Unfortunately, the use of technical 
terms does not by itself eliminate the ambiguities. Odlin (1986) has discussed 
the various ways in which the contrast between explicit and implicit 
knowledge has been understood, and Norman and Shallice (1986) have 
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identified ambiguities inherent in the concept of automatic processing, some of 
which are exact parallels to the ambiguities of consciousness. Since a great 
deal of debate about conscious and unconscious processes has been fueled by 
conceptual and definitional disagreements (Bowers 1984; White 1980), it is 
preferable to grapple with these issues directly, rather than masking them with 
alternative terms. 
It seems to me that when we speak of having being conscious of 
something, we most often mean that we were aware of it, that we subjectively 
experienced it as part of the "stream" of consciousness (Battista 1978; James 
1890; Natsoulis 1987). However, when we speak of having done something 
consciously, we may mean either that we did it with awareness of what we 
were doing or that we did it deliberately. This is one of the main ambiguities 
involved in most discussions of consciousness: consciousness as awareness vs. 
consciousness as intent (Ceci & Howe 1982). When we speak of consciousness 
as awareness, there is also a question of the degree or level of our awareness. 
We may mean that we simply noticed the occurrence of something or that we 
had an more abstract understanding of it (Bowers 1984). Therefore, when we 
speak of language learning as being conscious or unconscious, we might be 
thinking of several distinct aspects of the problem of consciousness in learning, 
including at least the following: whether a learner is trying to learn something; 
whether the learner is aware that he or she is learning; whether the target 
language forms that are learned are consciously noticed or picked up through 
some kind of subliminal perception; whether learners acquire general rules or 
principles on the basis of conscious understanding and insight or more 
intuitively; or whether learners are able to give an accurate account of the rules 
and principles that seem to underlie the construction of utterances. 
There is experimentally based literature from psychology that bears on all 
of these issues, along with a small amount of evidence from second language 
acquisition studies. It is useful to summarize the relevant research in terms of 
three principal distinctions. 
2.1 Conscious perception vs. subliminal influences in learning. 
My personal choice of a label for the key concept here is noticing, 
although there are a variety of technical terms for this, including focal 
awareness (Atkinson & Shiffrin 1968), episodic awareness (Allport 1979), 
conscious perception (Dixon 1971) and apperceived input (Gass 1988). Each of 
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these constructs presupposes the allocation of attentional resources to some 
stimulus and identifies the level at which perceived events are subjectively 
experienced and are reportable by the person who experiences them. 2 
Events may remain unnoticed for several reasons-because attention is 
directed elsewhere, because the information is too complex to be processed, or 
because it is presented too quickly or too softly to be consciously seen or heard. 
While it is virtually impossible when observing naturalistic language learning 
to know exactly what the learner has or has not noticed, the existence of 
unnoticed information can be established under experimental conditions by the 
failure of subjects to report their awareness of a stimulus if asked immediately 
following its presentation. This criterion of subjective awareness can be 
contrasted with an objective measure of perception, which various 
experimenters have argued is best established by a subject's ability to 
discriminate among two or more alternative stimuli in a forced choice task 
(Cheesman & Merikle 1986; Eriksen 1960; Moore 1989). 
Although many theorists believe that unconscious learning (in some 
sense) predominates in second language learning, it is very unlikely that what 
language learner consciously perceive or notice in input is unimportant for 
learning. A more difficult question is whether it is necessary to notice what is 
said in a language in order for that information to be stored in memory and to 
play a role in language learning, or whether it is also possible for some learning 
to be based on unnoticed information, information that is perceived at some 
level and perhaps processed subliminally without being consciously registered. 
There is a widespread belief (at least in North America) that the existence 
of subliminal learning of some kind has been established for decades. In the 
1950's, Packard objected to the covert manipulation of consumers through the 
use of subliminal messages in advertising (Packard, 1957), a theme expanded 
upon by Key (1973). Beginning in the 1980's, subliminal audio cassettes were 
aggressively marketed which promised everything from cures for obesity and 
drug addiction to enhanced visual acuity, improvement in examination 
performance and more effective language learning. However, there seems to 
2 I owe the distinction made here between information that is perceived and information that 
is noticed to Bowers (1984), who argues that information becomes conscious when it is 
processed to the level of short-term memory and selectively attended to. Bowers also 
distinguishes between two senses of unconscious, refcring to information that is unnoticed and 
information that is unappreciated or uncomprehcnded, and I have drawn upon his model in 
my description of subminal vs. implicit learning. 
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be virtually no scientific support for claims of behavior modification through 
subliminal messages. Moore has reviewed the research on subliminal 
techniques in advertising, concluding that the advertising stories everyone has 
heard about (such as the stimulation of movie theater patrons to buy popcorn 
or soft drinks through subliminal messages) are apocryphal. Such techniques 
probably never were used, and even if they were, "there is no evidence that 
subliminal messages can influence motivation or complex behavior" (Moore 
1988: 293). Merikle has examined commercially distributed "subliminal" audio 
tapes and subjected them to both psychophysical experimentation and 
spectrographic analysis, reporting that the cassettes analyzed contained no 
embedded subliminal messages whatsoever that could conceivably influence 
behavior (Merikle 1988: 355). 
There is a well attested phenomenon of subliminal perception. Stimuli 
which are presented too rapidly for conscious detection or in competition with 
tasks that are assumed to consume all attentional resources may activate 
existing memory structures and associations (Dixon 1971, 1981; Marcel 1983). 
Eich (1984) has reported experiments in which pairs of words were both 
presented to the unattended channel in a shadowing task, one of which was 
ambiguous (for example, fair or fare), while the other word biased its less 
common interpretation (for example, taxi). Recognition of both members of 
such pairs was poor, but in a spelling test subjects were biased in the direction 
of the disambiguated meaning. These and other similar demonstrations show 
that words that are not consciously perceived or noticed can be processed to 
the level of word meaning. However, all demonstrations of subliminal 
perception so far have involved subtle effects resulting from the unconscious 
detection and processing of very familiar stimuli. Such effects do not imply the 
creation of new memory structures, the establishment of new associations, or 
the learning of new concepts (Ericsson & Simon 1984; Underwood 1976, 1982), 
and certainly nothing remotely analogous to learning a second language. 
At the present time, the available evidence is compatible with the strong 
assertion that there is no such thing as subliminal language learning or any 
other kind of subliminal learning. Second language forms that are not noticed 
do not affect learning. This allows the concept of intake in second language 
learning to be defined in terms of what the learner attends to and notices 
(Schmidt 1990). 
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2.2 Explicit vs. implicit learning. 
The contrast between subliminal learning and implicit learning, or 
learning without understanding, has to do with the level of awareness 
involved. I use noticing to mean registering the simple occurrence of some 
event, whereas understanding implies recognition of a general principle, rule, 
or pattern. For example, a second language learner might simply notice that a 
native speaker used a particular form of address on a particular occasion, or at 
a deeper level the learner might understand the significance of such a form, 
realizing that the form used was appropriate because of status differences 
between speaker and hearer. Noticing is crucially related to the question of 
what linguistic material is stored in memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin 1968; 
Kihlstrom 1984); understanding relates to questions concerning how that 
material is organized into a linguistic system. 
Implicit learning refers to nonconscious generalization from examples. 
The general phenomenon of implicit learning has been well established in the 
psychological literature and is viewed as a natural product of attending to 
structured input (Hartman, Knopman & Nissen 1989; Reber 1989). There is a 
gathering consensus within psychology that the mechanisms of implicit 
learning probably involve the strengthening and weakening of connections 
between nodes in complex networks as the result of experience, rather than 
through the unconscious induction of rules abstracted from data. An example 
of this recent shift in perspective can be seen in the work of Reber, who has 
carried out numerous experiments involving exposing subjects to strings of 
letters generated by an artificial grammar. After training, subjects were able to 
make accurate judgements about the well-formedness of novel strings, without 
being able to articulate the rules of well-formedness (Reber 1976; Reber, Allen 
& Regan 1985; Reber, Kassin, Lewis & Cantor 1980). Until recently, Reber 
argued that knowledge resulting from implicit learning was encoded in the 
form of unconscious abstract representations. In a more recent publication, 
Abrams & Reber (1988) have suggested that implicit learning as demonstrated 
in these experiments probably rests upon some kind of covariation counter, a 
system that logs both event frequencies and event co-occurrences. One model 
that simulates the mechanisms currently believed to underlie implicit learning 
is Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP). PDP has been used to model the 
acquisition of the past tense in English (MacWhinney, forthcoming; Rumelhart 
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& McClelland 1986), the development of visual word recognition skills 
(Seidenberg & McClelland 1989), and the acquisition of gender in French 
(Sokolik & Smith 1989). 
Explicit learning, that is, conscious problem solving, relies on different 
mechanisms, including attempts to form mental representations, searching 
memory for related knowledge, and forming and testing hypotheses 
(Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Field, Cho & Druhan 1989; Johnson-Laird 
1983). Both implicit learning and explicit learning have particular strengths. 
Implicit learning appears to be superior for the learning of fuzzy patterns 
based on perceptual similarities and the detection of nonsalient covariance 
between variables, while explicit learning is superior when a domain contains 
rules that are based on logical relationships rather than perceptual similarities 
(Mathews et al. 1989). 
2.3 Intentional vs. incidental learning. 
Whereas the concepts of subliminal and implicit learning are both related 
to the consciousness as awareness, incidental learning refers to consciousness 
as intent. If, as I have claimed, it is necessary to notice the occurrence of 
linguistic forms in order for them to serve as intake for learning, is it also 
necessary to deliberately pay attention to such features in order to notice them? 
More generally, is it necessary to want to learn in order to learn? 
This is not as difficult a question as the others I have raised. In many 
cases, it does not matter if a language learner intends to pay attention or not. A 
language learner's limited processing abilities may make it impossible to notice 
something regardless of an intent to do so. There are other cases in which some 
task to be performed forces the learner's attention to be focused on some pieces 
of information rather than others, and in such cases what is stored in memory 
is the information that must be attended to in order to complete the task 
(Ericsson & Simon 1984); the learner's intention to learn is irrelevant (Anderson 
1985). On the other hand, there are many situations in which a language 
learner is free to opt in and out of learning contexts and to pay attention or not, 
depending on one's personal hierarchy of deep goals and momentary 
dispositions (Baars 1988; Kahneman 1973; Kihlstrom 1984), and in such cases 
paying attention is crucial. 
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3. Extensions to the learning of pragmatics and discoursal rules 
I have argued that linguistic forms can serve as intake for language learning 
only if they are noticed by learners; that paying attention to such forms is 
certainly helpful, but not necessary if other factors in the learning context focus 
attention on them so that they are noticed; and that general principles of the 
organization of language may be discovered through the use of either explicit 
or implicit learning mechanisms. I have also suggested that even in cases 
where what native speakers "know'' about the pragmatic principles of their 
language is inaccessible to consciousness, such knowledge may nevertheless be 
based on insights and understanding at the time of learning. What evidence is 
there that these claims are relevant for the learning of pragmatics? 
3.1 First language learning of pragmatics 
Research on the acquisition of first language pragmatics suggests that 
both noticing and some level of understanding are important in such learning. 
Clark (1978) has observed that the types of metalinguistic abilities shown by 
preschool children are primarily related to communicative interaction rather 
than grammatical form. The ethnographic literature on language socialization 
shows that an important child-rearing goal is to develop the child's 
communicative competence. Demuth (1986) has reported on the prompting 
routines for appropriate verbal behavior that play an active role in the social 
development of Basotho children. Ochs (1986) has described the ways in which 
Samoan caregivers use prosodic strategies for teaching children how to encode 
affect-laden utterances. Clancy (1986) has shown how Japanese mothers 
interweave questions and declarative hints to socialize children in the use of 
indirectness. Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo (1986) describes how Kawara'ae 
caregivers use repeating routines to teach children what to say and when to say 
it. These and many similar reports suggest that while parents and other 
caregivers use different socialization strategies in different cultures, there is 
probably universal validity to the observation of Gleason and Perlmann: 
Unlike the acquisition of syntax, semantics, and even some sociolinguistic 
rules, when it comes to speaking politely adults do not leave it to the child to 
construct the rules on his or her own. Here, they take an active, even 
energetic part in directly instructing their children in the use of the various 
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politeness devices. (Gleason & Perlmann 1985: 102) 
Snow, Perlmann, Gleason and Hooshyar (1990) have examined parent-
child interactions in 110 families in order to see what kinds of information 
concerning politeness strategies are made available to children from their 
interaction with parents. Assuming that the basic dimensions of power, social 
distance and degree of imposition underlie the general rule system for 
politeness, Snow et al. looked for evidence for three types of information that 
might be made available to children: direct teaching of general rules of 
politeness, manipulation of the dimensions of politeness so that the relevant 
covariations were made more salient, and information about the use of specific 
forms. Snow et al. found that the first type of information was rare, but that 
there was plentiful evidence in their data that children are explicitly told what 
forms to use in particular situations, and that correlations between forms and 
the dimensions of politeness were made salient in interaction. These findings 
suggest (though they do not prove this point) that children are not only 
exposed to but also notice surface forms. Children are also presented with 
information that could be used to induce more general principles (through 
either implicit or explicit learning mechanisms), but are not taught the 
underlying principles directly. 
3.2 Second language learning of pragmatics 
Since adults can report their understandings much more readily than 
children, it ought to be possible to examine the role of noticing and 
understanding in the development of pragmatic ability by adult second 
language learners directly, by asking learners to report their experiences. Even 
so, the relevant data are difficult to obtain, requiring both a sound 
methodology for eliciting self-reports (F<erch & Kasper 1987) and 
opportunities to catch learners in the actual process of learning, rather than 
simply performing their current competence. Unfortunately, there have been 
few studies of any aspect of the phenomenology of second language learning 
and no studies at all which have attempted systematically to ascertain what 
learners have been conscious of as pragmatic principles were learned. 
Anecdotally, there is evidence for a relationship between what learners 
notice and understand about pragmatics and discourse and what is learned. 
The following examples are from my own experience, either as a language 
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learner or from interacting in English with second language speakers with 
different linguistic and cultural backgrounds, and concern interactions about 
which I wrote brief notes to myself shortly after they happened. The first four 
examples represent the coincidence of recognition and insight with rapid 
learning; the last two represent instances of less successful-learning. 
(1) In the course of a 22·week stay in Brazil, during which I progressed from 
no proficiency at all in Portuguese to the S-2level on the FSI scale (see Schmidt 
& Frota 1986 for details), I kept a language learner's diary. Several entries 
illustrate the phenomenon of being told about some aspect of the pragmatics of 
Brazilian Portuguese in class and then almost immediately noticing it in input, 
such as the following: 
Journal entry, Week 6. This week we were introduced to and drilled on 
the imperfect ... The basic contrast seems straightforward enough: ontem eu fui 
ao clube 'yesterday I went to the club' vs. antigamente eu ia ao clube 'formerly I 
used to go to the club'. L gave us a third model: ontem eu ia ao clube 'yesterday 
I was going to the club', which L says is a common way of making 
excuses ... Wednesday night Amos came over to play cards, and the first thing 
he said was eu ia telefonar para voce 'I was going to call you', exactly the kind of 
excuse L had said we could expect. 
(2) I noted in my diary several times the difficulties I had with telephone 
conversations, especially in knowing when and how to end a conversation 
(Schmidt & Frota 1986:276). I knew that with friends the closing move would 
be for both parties to say ciao!, but I could never identify the point at which I 
could say it, so I would often stand holding the phone waiting patiently for the 
other person to say it first. Finally, during the last week of my stay, a friend 
came to my apartment and used my telephone to make several calls. I listened 
carefully, and noticed that in two successive calls, shortly before saying ciao, 
my friend said the phrase enttio tti, which means no more than "so, then." 
Suspecting that this might be a pre-closing formula, I immediately called 
another friend and after a few minutes of talk, said enttio tti, paused briefly and 
plunged ahead with ciao in the same turn. It worked, and after that I had no 
trouble at all getting off the phone efficiently. I subsequently asked several 
native speakers how to close a telephone conversation. None could tell me, but 
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when I suggested the use of enUio td, they agreed that was right. 
(3) Midway through my stay in Brazil, I took a trip to another city for several 
days, and later wanted to send postcards to people I had met there. I wrote a 
few cards, and then asked a native speaker to rewrite one for me. I noticed that 
he began rephrasing my message with the expression E a(, como estao? 'So, 
how are you?', so I did the same with each subsequent card. A week after 
sending the cards, I got a call from one of the recipients (a native speaker of 
English who was a long-term resident in Brazil) who began the conversation by 
commenting that my Portuguese must be improving rapidly, given the 
colloquially appropriate style of my postcard. 
(4) On the first day of a two-week trip to Thailand, I presented a paper at the 
end of the day at a national conference. After the lecture, several Thais with 
whom I would be working for the following week approached me and made 
some brief remarks in English (I know no Thai) and then slipped away. I 
found myself standing by myself much quicker than I expected, and had the 
unsettling feeling that my talk must have been very poorly received. I 
returned to my hotel feeling quite depressed about this. That evening, I looked 
over some materials that I had collected during the day, including an article by 
Sukwiwat and Fieg (1987) on greeting and leave-taking in Thai. Sukwiwat and 
Fieg pointed out that conversations are closed quickly in Thai but tend to be 
drawn gradually to a close in English, so that Americans are often taken aback 
by what appear to be abrupt, brusque and sometimes rude departures. Thais, 
on the other hand, think that American leave-takings drag on excessively and 
involve unnecessary verbiage. I immediately realized that I might have 
misinterpreted the significance of what had happened earlier. For the 
remainder of my stay, I tried my best to beat the Thais at their own game by 
closing conversations faster than they could, for example by suddenly 
announcing, "well, I'm leaving now." I never succeeded in getting away faster 
than they did, but my disquiet at this aspect of Thai behavior evaporated and I 
suffered no discomfort from behaving in a way that would be rude by my own 
cultural norms. 
(5) Between the early 1960's and mid 1970's I lived mostly in Arabic-speaking 
countries and became fairly proficient in both Egyptian and Lebanese Arabic. 
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In some varieties of Arabic, parents and other relatives may address children 
with what Ayoub (1964) has called bi-polar kin terms, ego addressing alter 
with the term which in its literal sense would be appropriate for alter 
addressing ego, e.g. a grandfather may address his granddaughter with a term 
equivalent to "grandpa." This occurs when the senior·wants the junior to do 
something, but chooses a conciliatory request form, metaphorically reversing 
the power relationship between the two, what Brown and Levinson (1987) 
would call a point-of-view operation. I knew of this phenomenon only from 
Ayoub's article, however. I never noticed parents using it with their children in 
either Egypt or Lebanon, although I often observed parents and other family 
members interacting with children. Years later, I noticed the use of such a form 
when visiting friends from Lebanon in California. Playing in the swimming 
pool, the mother said to her son, in English, "OK, Baron, swim down the other 
end of the pool now, Mommy." I have since been assured by speakers of both 
Egyptian and Lebanese Arabic that they do use such forms, but second 
language speakers of Arabic whom I have asked have reported that, like me, 
they have never noticed it being used. 
(6) In several publications (Schmidt 1983, 1984) I reported on a case study o~ a 
Japanese learner of English whose overall level of communicative competence 
was superior to his rather rudimentary control of English grammar. In looking 
at the development of pragmatic ability by my subject, Wes, I found that he 
often used hints that native speakers of English, including myself, did not 
realize were intended as directives. For example, once in a theater, Wes turned 
to me and asked me if I liked my seat. I responded that my seat was fine, not 
realizing at all that he was indirectly requesting that we change places. After 
many years of interacting with Japanese speakers of English, I think that I now 
recognize such hints on most occasions, but this has been a slow learning 
process. 
All of these anecdotes indicate an apparently very close connection 
between noticing what was present in input and learning. Each case of 
successful learning also involved more than just noticing the forms used, but 
also an appreciation of their functional meaning, i.e. the fact that an 
imperfective signaled an excuse, that entiio tti was a preclosing device, that e 
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a( was useful for greetings, that an abrupt departure did not necessarily imply 
a problem. Two of my Portuguese examples also illustrate intentional rather 
than incidental learning-! was deliberately seeking speech routines for 
openings and closings, and discovered them. By contrast, in the case of abrupt 
Thai departures, the learning was incidental; I had no prior awareness of a 
learning problem or intent to learn anything. I noticed the behavior and may 
or may not have carried on some conscious inferencing in arriving at my 
conclusion that my poor lecture lay behind it (those thought processes are not 
recoverable), but my corrected understanding of the significance of such 
behavior was fortuitous and the information was externally provided. In the 
case of the Portuguese imperfect used for excuses, explicit information about 
pragmatic function seems to have made the input more salient, though it is 
virtually certain that such forms were in input all along. 
In contrast to the Thai example, externally provided information about 
Arabic bi-polar kinterms had no effect on my learning. I never noticed their 
occurrence in the dialects to which I was exposed, and they never became part 
of my competence in Arabic. This example suggests some of the difficulty in 
accounting for what becomes conscious and what does not. This is a complex 
issue beyond the scope of this paper, but part of such an account would 
include Baars' observation that events remain unnoticed if they are either 
uninterpretable in context or so stable as to be part of the context (Baars 1983). 
The Arabic use of bi-polar kinterms seems to be especially opaque to native 
speakers of English, who find them nearly uninterpretable. 3 In the case of 
both Thai departures and Wes's hints in English, the problem lay not in 
noticing what was said but in understanding what was intended. The 
interpretation of hints is problematic for native speakers as well as learners 
(Ervin-Tripp 1976), but it is not clear to me why externally provided 
information was sufficient to block future inferences from abrupt departures to 
perception of a problem in the case of my Thai example, whereas knowledge 
about Japanese speech behavior at a similar level of generality did not lead 
quickly to the establishment of the appropriate inferencing behavior. 
3 When I have presented this example to naUve speakers of English, they have often assumed 
that the mother must have meant for her son to "swim TO Mommy," but this is not a correct 
interpretation, i.e. this is not an example of a missing preposition. 
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4. Explicit and implicit learning of general principles 
While all of my examples involve understanding in the sense of matching 
surface forms with meaning, none of them are good examples of generalization 
from specific examples to more general principles. However, there are cases in 
which the learning of pragmatics and discourse must involve such 
generalization, for example, not just the recognition and use of frozen routines 
such as entiio td and e a(, como estiio, but learning less frozen formulas, as well 
as fully productive structures for speech act realizations. 
A good example of the involvement of consciousness in generalizing a 
formula has been provided by Ferguson in recalling his learning of Arabic 
root-echo responses. There are numerous adjacency pairs in Arabic in which a 
greeting, compliment or other initiating utterance requires a formulaic 
response which contains a lexical item (usually a verb) derived from the 
triconsonantal root of the most important lexical item in the initiating 
utterance. On one occasion, Ferguson bought an article of clothing in a market, 
and when the purchase was complete the seller said to him mabruuk 
(congratulations). He did not know the response formula for this, but did 
know that an appropriate response form would be one which contained the 
root BRK from the first part of the adjacency pair. By analogy with several 
other response formulas that he did know, he guessed what the root-echo 
response form might be. Ferguson comments: 
Probably 'alia ybaarik fiik was the root-echo response to BRK. I tried it, and 
the smile showed I had given the right reply. The whole analysis took only a 
split second, and was just like getting an instance of grammatical concord or 
case government right. Ferguson 1976: 141) 
This is an example of conscious problem solving or explicit learning, but I 
have indicated that implicit language learning is also possible. It may be useful, 
therefore, to spell out in some detail how more general principles of 
pragmatics might be acquired without being conscious of them. 
Following Fox (1987) and Spolsky (1989), I suggest that some pragmatic 
and discoursal principles are better represented as associative networks rather 
than as propositional rules, and that connectionist models are promising in 
accounting for those aspects of pragmatic knowledge that do appear to be 
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unconscious. This may involve less of a paradigm shift in the areas of 
pragmatics and discourse than in syntax, since researchers in pragmatics have 
had a less fixed notion of what is meant by a "rule" of pragmatics than have 
syntacticians, and relatively little attention has been given to consideration of 
how such rules might be represented psychologically. Some 
ethnomethodologists have rejected the concept of rules as conceived in formal 
logic as a model of social action (Mehan & Wood 1975). Probabilistic network 
approaches have been suggested for the analysis of code-switching (Dearholt & 
Valdes-Falles 1978); and Pomerantz (1978) has described compliment responses 
as the result of the cooperation of multiple constraints. Each of these 
approaches is compatible with a connectionist interpretation. 
There is one type of representation of pragmatic rules which I think is 
psychologically implausible, but which can also be recast in network form. 
The distribution of address forms has been represented by both Geoghegan 
(1971) and Ervin-Tripp (1972) in the form of a flow chart, illustrating decision 
points in the form of serially ordered binary selectors. For American English, 
Ervin-Tripp indicates that the first question to be asked is whether or not the 
addressee is a child or adult; then, if an adult, whether the interaction takes 
place within a status-marked setting; if the setting is not status-marked, 
whether the addressee's name is known; if the name is known, whether the 
addressee is kin; if not kin, whether the addressee is a friend or colleague; if so, 
whether the address is of higher rank; and so on, finally exiting the system 
with an appropriate address form. Ervin-Tripp and Geoghegan state explicitly 
that while paths through the flowchart represent rules, such flowcharts are like 
a formal grammar in representing a logical model and are not intended as 
psychological models of decision-making. There are various problems with 
these models. Kendall (1981) has pointed out that they are too deterministic, 
and that a factor called "dispensation," meaning essentially to disregard all 
other factors, is introduced to get around the problem of variability. Positing 
serially ordered selectors also implies complete scalability (each selector must 
be listed only once, and selectors encountered first in the flowchart must 
outweigh all subsequent selectors in their influence), which cannot be 
empirically supported. For the present discussion, the most important 
drawback to such models is that they are unlikely to have any psychological 
reality. While conscious choices of which address forms in unclear situations 
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might indeed involve sequential consideration of the types of selectors 
contained within flowcharts, there is little reason to suggest that automatic 
choices are made on the basis of speeded up serial processing; most 
psychological accounts of automatic processing assume that parallel processes 
dominate. However, flowcharts such as those suggested by Ervin-Tripp and 
Geoghegan can easily be restructured into connectionist architecture, and the 
choice of address forms can be reconceptualized as a network of unordered 
connections between features of social context (addressee age, rank, marital 
status, etc.) and linguistic outputs. Some connections between social context 
features and address forms may be so heavily weighted that the connection is 
almost categorical, while others may be very weak, leading to fuzzier, less 
determinate outcomes. 
Other kinds of pragmatic knowledge that may be similarly represented 
include the complex patterns of co-variation among features of social context 
and the linguistic realizations of speech acts that have been empirically 
documented by analysis of CCSARP data (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper 1989). 
The theoretical framework proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987), which 
attempts to relate a very wide range of pragmatic realizations to variation in 
three basic contextual features, social distance, power, and culture-specific 
evaluations of threat to face is a similar case, since these cooperating (or 
conflicting) constraints exert probabilistic influences. 
If we assume that associative network models have some face validity as a 
model of implicit pragmatic knowledge, we may then ask how such 
knowledge may be acquired, and specifically the role that consciousness is 
likely to play in the establishment of a network. There is some evidence from 
experimental psychology that bears on several aspects of this question. 
(1) Do learners have to keep track (consciously, by counting) of the frequency 
with which contextual or pragmatic features occur? The answer to this is 
almost certainly no. Learners may be able to make reasonably accurate 
estimates of the relative frequency of such things, but they do not do so by 
counting, and it is widely accepted that attention to a stimulus event is 
sufficient to trigger the automatic (effortless and unintended) encoding of its 
frequency of occurrence (Hasher & Zacks 1984). 
(2) Do learners need to notice the specific relevant pragmalinguistic or 
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contextual features of an event in order to trigger such encoding of frequency? 
This question is somewhat controversial, but the answer is probably yes. 
Hanson and Hirst (1988) point out that an event may be thought of as a cluster 
of attributes. They report experiments supporting the hypothesis that attention 
to specific stimulus attributes is necessary in order to encode frequency 
information for those attributes. 
(3) Do learners need to understand the significance of co-occurring linguistic 
and social context features in order to acquire a network of complex 
covariations? This is perhaps the most interesting question, and strikes to the 
heart of what is meant by implicit learning. Experiments in implicit learning 
suggest that implicit learning may be self-organizing, and that it is not 
necessary to realize the significance of one event for another in order to 
establish connections. 
Lewicki (1986) has reported a series of experiments designed to 
demonstrate the nonconscious detection of covariations involving social 
stimulus material. Subjects were presented with a series of descriptions of 
persons which mentioned a number of psychological and social characteristics. 
Some of these traits were manipulated by the experimenter, either to confirm 
or disconfirm pre-existing stereotypes. After a learning phase, subjects rated 
new stimulus material. The experiments showed that correlations built into 
the personality descriptions during the learning phase influenced judgments in 
the testing phase. By running different versions of the same basic experiment, 
Lewicki was able to assess subject awareness at various points in learning. 
Subjects did notice the manipulated traits (as intended by the experimenter) 
and were momentarily aware of their co-occurrence in single stimulus 
descriptions. 4 That is, they were able to recall both of them when questioned 
4 In another series of experiments, Lewicki (1986) attempted to demonstrate that information 
which is presented sub1iminally or which is not attended to may also lead to learning. These 
experiments did not successfully demonstrate learning, but some interesting subtle effects 
were found. Subjects responded more slowly to questions mentioning those stimulus traits 
that had been presented subliminally. Lewicki argues that this demonstrates the internalization 
of weak processing algorithms which could eventually result in more demonstrable learning 
effects. Such an experimental demonstration would disprove my claim that there is no 
subliminal learning whatsoever. Baars (1988) has claimed that this zero-point question is 
essentially unanswerable and has obscured the more important and answerable question of 
whether more conscious involvement is needed to learn more information, the answer to 
which is clearly affirmative. 
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immediately after exposure. However, the subjects were unaware of any 
systematic relationship between the manipulated traits. When told that some 
traits (out of a large number used as descriptors) had been systematically 
manipulated by the experimenter, subjects were unable to identify which ones 
had been manipulated. 
Analogously, we can specify the minimum requirements of learning an 
address system (or any other system of complex covariations) in a second 
language. If the task is to acquire an address system in which the 
ingroup/outgroup distinction is relevant or in which address forms 
systematically vary by sex of addressee, learners must attend to and notice in 
input both the linguistic forms and the relevant contextual features. This may 
mean attending to features of context that either are not relevant or are defined 
differently in the native language, so that learning a new pragmatic system 
often entails learning how to make new interpretative assessments of the 
world. However, it does not seem to be necessary for learners to make any 
conscious connection between the address forms encountered and the 
contextual factors that are correlated with such forms. For example, in learning 
the address system of Japanese, when you hear someone you know as Mr. 
Morita addressed as Morita-kun, where kun is an address form, you must 
notice both the form and the relevant contextual factors (these include sex, age 
and rank of both speaker and addressee, intimacy, tone, and setting) if this is to 
be intake for learning, but need not draw the conclusion that Morita was 
addressed that way BECAUSE of any of these factors. 
Nevertheless, it would certainly be extremely helpful to be consciously 
aware of such connections. It is sometimes argued that implicit learning is 
superior to conscious problem solving (Krashen 1981), but this seems to be true 
for only some types of learning tasks. Reber has reported several times that 
subjects learning artificial grammars under an implicit learning condition 
(subjects were told to memorize examples, which presumably interfered with 
any attempt to analyze the input) were better able to recognize valid new 
strings generated by the grammar than those subjects who were told to try to 
figure out the rules of the underlying grammar. However, it cannot be 
assumed that subjects who attempted to discover the rules succeeded in doing 
so. In a recent publication, Reber (1989) makes exactly this point. Arguing that 
the particular artificial grammar to be learned was constructed in such a way 
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that subjects were unlikely to be able to find the rules they were searching for, 
Reber now argues that "looking for rules will not work if you cannot find 
them," but "looking for rules will work if you can find them" (Reber 1989: 223}. 
McLeod and McLaughlin (1986) report anecdotal evidence for the frequent 
occurrence of rapid restructuring following "clicks of comprehension." 
5. Conclusions 
The data from experimental psychology clearly support a conservative 
hypothesis that whatever learning might result from unattended processing is 
insignificant compared to the results of attended processing. The data seem to 
me to be also compatible with two much stronger hypotheses, that attention to 
input is a necessary condition for any learning at all, and that what must be 
attended to is not input in general, but whatever features of the input play a 
role in the system to be learned. For the learning of pragmatics in a second 
language, this requires attention to linguistic forms, functional meanings, and 
the relevant contextual features. I also claim that learners experience their 
learning, that attention is subjectively experienced as noticing, and that the 
attentional threshold for noticing is the same as the threshold for learning. 
Finally, I have argued that, while incidental and implicit learning are both 
possible, consciously paying attention to the relevant features of input and 
attempting to analyze their significance in terms of deeper generalizations are 
both highly facilitative. 
I do not claim that the anecdotal examples from my own language 
learning experiences prove these points, because the most that language 
learner diary reports can establish is that learners have noticed crucial facts 
about language use. What is needed is much more systematically gathered 
data on what learners notice (and are able to report} and what they do not 
notice (are unable to report) as they are learning. 5 Suspicions have been 
5 Michael Long (personal communication) has pointed out to me that language learners may 
sometimes produce a vocabulary item in a second language that they did not know they knew 
until that moment, not being sure that it is right and certainly not knowing how it ever got into 
the mental lexicon. However, the issue of whether the Ieamer noticed such a lexical item in 
input (which must have occurred, if my account is correct) is quite separate from the question 
of whether the Ieamer will be able to say much later when it was encountered. We know all 
sorts of things without being able to recall the circumstances under which we acquired that 
knowledge. 
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voiced that 11it is doubtful that [introspection] can shed light on how the learner 
moves from one state to another, i.e. how input becomes intake11 (Ellis 1989b). I 
think that investigation of the Ieamer's thoughts at such points of change is just 
what needs to be investigated. Even the harshest critics of reliance upon 
introspective methods agree that individuals do know the focus of their 
attention at any given point in time, as well as the content of their current 
thoughts, emotions, evaluations and plans (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) and that 
these conscious thought processes can be reported. A priori conclusions that 
there will be no relationships between such phenomena and language 
development are unwarranted. 
No strong prescriptions for the teaching of second language pragmatics 
can be drawn from this discussion, but some general observations seem in 
order. Simple exposure to sociolinguistically appropriate input is unlikely to 
be sufficient for second language acquisition of pragmatic and discoursal 
knowledge because the linguistic realizations of pragmatic functions are 
sometimes opaque to language learners and because the relevant contextual 
factors to be noticed for are likely to be defined differently or may be 
nonsalient for the learner. Second language learners may fail to experience the 
crucial noticings for years. The fact that this does not seem to happen in first 
language learning is attributable not to any sort of pragmatics acquisition 
device, but to the efforts that parents and other caregivers make in order to 
teach communicative competence to children, using a variety of strategies. 
Motivation is an important determinant of the allocation of attentional 
resources (Crookes & Schmidt 1989). Because of the close connections among 
pragmatic realization strategies, assessments of role and status relationships 
between speaker and hearer, and the expression of personality, it is likely that 
there is a stronger relationship between motivation, acculturation and other 
affective factors in the development of pragmatic and discoursal ability than in 
other aspects of language learning, such as syntax (Schmidt 1983). Those who 
are concerned with establishing relationships with target language speakers 
are more likely to pay close attention to the pragmatic aspects of input and to 
struggle to understand than those who are not so motivated. But since 
intentional learning is unnecessary when some task causes attention to be 
focused on what is to be learned, one way to develop pragmatic competence in 
classroom contexts could be through task-based language teaching (Long, to 
appear). Tasks can be selected which focus the learner's attention on pragmatic 
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forms, functions and co-occurring features of social context. 
Explicit teacher-provided information about the pragmatics of the second 
language can also play a role in learning, provided that it is accurate and not 
based solely on fallible native speaker intuitions. Explicit teaching is often 
more efficient than attention to input for identifying the pragmalinguistic 
forms of the target language. The understanding of general rules and patterns 
may be unnecessary for learning, but Grossberg (1988) has argued that the 
learning mechanisms modeled in connectionist networks are slow because they 
result only from gradual changes in the bottom-up adaptive weights of the 
network, whereas top-down processes such as focused attention and 
expectations greatly speed up and actively reorganize the way in which input 
is processed. This is not to claim that explicit knowledge somehow 1'becomes" 
implicit knowledge~ but to recognize a synergistic relationship between the 
mechanisms of implicit and explicit learning (Mathews et al. 1989), which 
justifies a consciousness-raising approach to the teaching of pragmatics. 
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